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Abstract As consumers exhibit relatively more self-control over healthy products by
limiting the purchase quantity of vice choices and buying more virtue choices to adhere
to healthy-eating goals, a price promotion has a stronger effect on virtue than vice
choices of healthy food. In contrast, consumers exhibit relatively less self-control over
unhealthy products and evaluate price promotions as a persuasive temptation mecha-
nism; thus, a price promotion has a stronger effect on vice than virtue choices of
unhealthy food. The results of the empirical analyses provide support for these
hypotheses.
Keywords Price promotion . Relative virtue . Relative vice
1 Introduction
Products with virtuous features provide consumers with alternative choices to regular
products, and retailers endeavor to use price promotions to propel sales of these
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products. Despite this, marketing scholars have paid intermittent attention to the effect
of price promotions of virtue and vice products on sales using scanner data.
Virtue and vice products are related concepts (Parreño-Selva, Mas-Ruiz, and Ruiz-
Conde 2014). They differ in the gain and loss domain, such that relative vices refer to
products that provide immediate benefits (e.g., the good taste of crisps) but delayed
costs (e.g., obesity in the future) and relative virtues refer to products that have
immediate costs (e.g., the bad taste of oat bran) but delayed benefits (e.g., good health
in the future). Healthy and unhealthy foods fall into the category of relative virtue and
vice products (Kivetz and Keinan, 2006; Thomas, Desai, and Seenivasan 2011),
respectively. An unhealthy food offers an immediate gratifying experience but has
negative long-term outcomes, and a healthy food offers a less gratifying experience in
the short run but has fewer negative long-term outcomes (Wertenbroch 1998).
Moreover, although retail sales of relative virtue and vice choices have
proliferated in both healthy food (e.g., low-sugar vs regular baked beans) and
unhealthy food (e.g., low-fat vs regular crisps), scant marketing research has
shed light on whether the promotion effects of relative virtue or vice choices
differ across healthy and unhealthy products. We uncover this neglected but
important side of the price promotion effects of virtues and vices by hypoth-
esizing that consumers have differential responses to the relative virtue and vice
choices of healthy and unhealthy food.
This study aims to contribute to the literature by generating a greater understanding
of the debate over whether price promotions are more effective for virtue or vice
products. To our knowledge, the only two studies related to price promotions of virtue
and vice products using scanner data are those of Wertenbroch (1998) and Parreño-
Selva et al. (2014). Wertenbroch (1998) proposes that consumers of vice products
impose self-control by limiting the quantity bought and that this purchase quantity
rationing makes them less likely to purchase large quantities in response to price
promotions. This argument supports the observation that the price promotion effect is
smaller for vice than virtue products. In contrast, Parreño-Selva et al. (2014) propose
that anticipating long-term regret over not choosing vice products increases the pro-
pensity to choose vice over virtue at the moment of price promotion. Therefore, this
argument supports a greater price promotion effect for vice than virtue products. These
studies thus find opposite results as to whether the effect of price promotions is greater
for vices or for virtues. These mixed findings suggest that the price promotion effect
can be masked, and apart from factors such as purchase context (e.g., store type),
marketing factors (e.g., brand type), and specific food categories (e.g., utilitarian/
hedonic), we surmise that this is due to a lack of a nuanced classification of virtues
and vices. For example, the empirical evidence Parreño-Selva et al. (2014) provide is
based on alcoholic and non-alcoholic beer. As beer is an addictive vice product (see
Kivetz and Keinan 2006), their study examines the price promotion effect only on an
unhealthy product.1 This leaves the question unanswered as to how the price promotion
effects on relative vice and virtue choices vary across healthy and unhealthy products.
We propose that a separate examination of relative vices and virtues for healthy and
unhealthy products would shed more light on the price promotion effects of virtues and
1 Following Kivetz and Keinan (2006), Thomas et al. (2011), and Wertenbroch (1998), we characterize vice
products as unhealthy products.
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vices. We argue that the self-control pattern differs across healthy and unhealthy
products, such that consumers exhibit more self-control over unhealthy products
because their natural impulse to consume such products is stronger.
In line with this argument, the price promotion effects of relative virtues and vices
differ across healthy and unhealthy products. For healthy products, consumers exhibit
relatively more self-control by limiting the purchase quantity of vice choices and are
more likely to choose virtue choices to adhere to their healthy-eating goals. Therefore,
the price promotion effects are smaller for virtue choices of healthy products than for
vice choices. In contrast, for unhealthy products, consumers exhibit relatively less self-
control and greater impulsive urges (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Shiv and Fedorikhin
1999); thus, temptation mechanisms such as price promotions (Nakamura et al. 2015)
lead to vice choices of unhealthy products. Therefore, the price promotion effects are
stronger for vice choices of unhealthy products than for virtue choices. This is the central
point in the theoretical development of this study. To address this neglected but
important issue, we provide a more nuanced classification of virtues and vices, which
we divide into four categories, and compare the price promotion effects between them:
(1) a healthy virtue product (HVT) refers to a product with virtuous features in a healthy
food (e.g., low-sugar baked beans, low-calorie fruit juice), (2) a healthy vice product
(HVC) refers to a product with no or fewer virtuous features in a healthy food (e.g.,
regular baked beans, regular fruit juice), (3) an unhealthy virtue product (UHVT) refers
to a product with virtuous features in an unhealthy food (e.g., low-fat crisps, low-alcohol
beer), and (4) an unhealthy vice product (UHVC) refers to a product with no or fewer
virtuous features in an unhealthy food (e.g., regular crisps, regular beer). Moreover, as
consumer choices differ across social classes and pricing strategies vary across store
types, this study aims to provide generalized findings related to the price promotion
effects of HVT, HVC, UHVT, and UHVC across different social classes and store types.
2 Theoretical development and hypotheses
This study hypothesizes that sales are more sensitive to the price promotion of a relative
virtue choice than to that of a relative vice choice of healthy food and more sensitive to
the price promotion of a relative vice choice than to that of a relative virtue choice of
unhealthy food. We propose this for two reasons. First, self-control is less required for
healthy food consumption than for unhealthy food consumption (Shiv and Fedorikhin
1999; Thomas et al. 2011); thus, consumers are better able to adopt self-control by
limiting their purchase quantity of vice choices in healthy than unhealthy food con-
sumption (Wertenbroch 1998). Consumers of healthy products exhibit a deliberate and
strong goal for healthy eating (Thomas et al. 2011); thus, they are more likely to adopt
strong self-regulation to adhere to this important goal by purchasing more virtue than
vice choices of healthy food in response to a price promotion. Second, consumers
exhibit greater impulses to consume unhealthy food, and this causes more differential
self-control problems (Ramanathan and Menon 2006; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999).
Therefore, the price promotion is a tempting mechanism that depletes one’s self-
regulation resources to justify vice choices of unhealthy food.
Consumers exhibit distinct levels of self-control over healthy and unhealthy food.
Self-control problems arise from impulsive behavior (Wertenbroch 1998). Baumeister
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(2002, p. 670) defines impulsive behavior as Bbehavior that is not regulated and that
results from an unplanned, spontaneous impulse^ and thus goes against one’s self-
interest and long-term goals. Unhealthy foods are more likely to be consumed on
impulse (overweigh present, immediate consequences) because impulsivity is an influ-
ential antecedent of unhealthy food consumption (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Rook
1987). The emotive imagery and associated desire for unhealthy products (e.g., cook-
ies, doughnuts, cakes) trigger impulsive purchase decisions (Loewenstein 1996; Shiv
and Fedorikhin 1999; Thomas et al. 2011; Wertenbroch 1998). This idea is in line with
marketing scholars’ findings that the impulse to consume unhealthy food is stronger
than that to consume healthy food (Talukdar and Lindsey 2013). Therefore, unhealthy
food poses a greater need for self-control than healthy food.
Moreover, healthy eating is a more mindful, planned, and deliberative behavior (see
Thomas et al. 2011) because consumers often portray healthy eating as a goal.
Therefore, purchase decisions associated with healthy products are more Bdeliberative^
(Thomas et al. 2011) and reflect consumers’ healthy-eating goals. According to goal
congruency theory (Fishbach and Zhang 2008), when an individual’s key goal is
activated by a choice set, he or she is more likely to adhere to that goal and declare a
positive evaluation of the congruent choice. This argument is built on research and
theory related to the dynamics of self-regulation (Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Fishbach,
Dhar, and Zhang 2006). Self-regulation dynamics can be distinguished as highlighting
and balancing dynamics, which Fishbach and Zhang (2008, p. 548) describe as follows:
Bin a highlighting dynamic, individuals consistently choose alternatives that are in
alignment with the more important goal, whereas in a balancing dynamic, individuals
alternate between that high-order goal and a low-order temptation in successive
choices.^ Thus, when an individual chooses to purchase a healthy product, a healthy-
eating goal is activated and his or her self-regulation system enters a highlighting
dynamic. Under such a dynamic, the individual puts higher value on the long-term goal
(i.e., long and healthy life) than on the short-term goal (i.e., eating tasty but unhealthy
food) and is more likely to make choices adhering to the long-term goal. Therefore,
consumers are more likely to buy more relative virtue than vice choices of healthy food
on sale.
This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H1 A price promotion has a stronger effect on virtue choices of healthy food than on
vice choices of healthy food.
In contrast, we propose that price promotion effects are stronger for vice than virtue
choices of unhealthy food because consumers have less self-control over unhealthy
food and price promotions act as a tempting mechanism to provide a license/
justification for making unhealthy vice choices.
It is a well-established notion that consumers exhibit greater impulses to consume
unhealthy food and have greater self-control problems over unhealthy food
(Raghunathan, Walker-Naylor, and Hoyer 2006; Ramanathan and Menon 2006; Shiv
and Fedorikhin 1999; Ubel 2009; Vohs and Heatherton 2000). The impulsive con-
sumption literature provides several reasons for this notion. Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999)
propose that unhealthy food is preferable to healthy food because of the individual’s
natural affective responses to unhealthy food. Raghunathan et al. (2006) posit that
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individuals operate under the Bunhealthy = tasty^ intuition, which leads to the choice of
unhealthy food. Vohs and Heatherton (2000) find that self-regulation failure is caused
by the depletion of an underlying cognitive self-regulating resource. Ramanathan and
Menon (2006) assert that impulsive behavior is driven by an activation chronicity of
hedonic/pleasure-seeking goals. Moreover, it is more difficult to resist unhealthy than
healthy food when the consumers’ utility from immediate gratification exceeds their
disutility from long-term unhealthiness (Ubel 2009). Therefore, it is a steep challenge to
regulate impulsive purchases and unhealthy food consumption.
Moreover, the licensing effects of price promotions strengthen the preference for
relative vice choices of unhealthy food by depleting consumers’ limited self-control
resources. Consumers’ hedonic, visceral, and pleasure-seeking goals cause them to
experience desires for unhealthy/indulgent/luxury products (Shiv and Fedorikhin
2002). However, such goals may conflict with others, such as having healthy and long
lives, and cause intense ambivalence (Ramanathan and Menon 2006). It is thus more
difficult to justify the vice choices of unhealthy food over virtue choices. In line with
the self-control literature, the licensing effect increases Bthe preference for a relative
luxury by dampening the negative self-attributions associated with such items^ (Khan
and Dhar 2006, p. 264). Self-regulation resources are limited, and their depletion leads
to self-regulation failure (Vohs and Heatherton 2000). Tempting mechanisms such as
price promotions (see Nakamura et al. 2015) and credit (see Thomas et al. 2011)
diminish one’s capacity for self-regulation by offering rewards (e.g., paying less,
gaining credit, curbing pain of paying, relieving guilt) (Lee-Wingate and Corfman
2010). Price promotions can thus lend justification for buying more impulsive choices
(i.e., vice-unhealthy food). Therefore, consumers are more likely to buy more vice than
virtue choices of unhealthy food on sale.
This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H2 A price promotion has a stronger effect on vice choices of unhealthy food than on
virtue choices of unhealthy food.
3 Data and modeling approach
Data collection took place at three types of grocery stores in the United Kingdom: hi-lo
store, everyday low-price store, and convenience store. We examined four product
categories depending on their healthiness. According to the findings of one of the most
thorough nutrient profiling surveys (see Scarborough, Rayner, Stockley, and Black
2007), we categorized these four products as relatively healthy (i.e., baked beans and
fresh fruit juices) or relative unhealthy (i.e., crisps and beer).2 Any brand labeled Blow
fat^ (crisps), Blow sugar^ (baked beans), or Blow calorie^ (fresh fruit juices) represent-
ed the relative virtues within the product category. Owing to a lack of observations for
non-alcoholic beer, we adopted an approach similar to Wertenbroch’s (1998) and
2 We conducted a post-test on 95 random UK consumers to evaluate the degree of healthiness of baked beans,
fresh fruit juices, crisps, and beer. The results show that 71 and 66% of the participants perceived baked beans
and fresh fruit juices as healthy products, respectively, and 73 and 73% of the participants perceived crisps and
beer as unhealthy products, respectively. Therefore, consumers’ perceptions of the classification of healthy
versus unhealthy products for these four products are in accordance with this study.
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contrasted regular and light beer.3 We categorized all the brands as relative virtue and
relative vice sub-categories within each product category and applied the store/national
brand indicator as another brand-related characteristic. Table 1 presents the overview
cross-tabulation of choice (1 = virtue choice, 0 = vice choice). Approximately 10% of
all the purchases are relative virtue choices, with 56% of the virtue choices made on
healthy food and 44% made on unhealthy food.
The transaction data set contains 1,497,243 observations for 18,097 UK households
between October 2002 and February 2009 across four product categories. The variables
in this data set include quantity, price,4 and amount paid, which can be matched with
the product category and brand name through universal product codes (UPCs).
Consumer demographic variables such as age, household size, and social class were
collected from household surveys and can be matched with the transaction data set
through consumer panel ID. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables. Beer
has by far the largest price dispersion, and the most expensive beer costs 10 times more
than the cheapest beer. We construct an indicator variable for virtuous features. When a
category offers a virtuous feature of relative virtue (RVit), its RVit is 1 and 0 otherwise.
Thus, the third panel in Table 2 shows that baked beans and beer with virtuous features
are more frequently purchased across all the observations (11 and 18%, respectively)
than fresh fruit juices and crisps (9 and 2%, respectively). The bottom panels of Table 2
present summary statistics related to consumer characteristics, including social class,
age, and household size. Among the participant households in the data set, the primary
shopper is 49 years of age on average (with the youngest 18 and the oldest 89) and has
about 3 family members.
We adopt Wertenbroch’s (1998) model of the effect of price promotions on sales and
consider the possible differences between relative virtue and vice choice within each
product category:
lnQit ¼ β0 þ β1RVit þ β2lnPriceit þ β3RVit*lnPriceit þ β4NBik þ β5STi þ β6SCi
þ β7AGi þ β8HSi þ εit ð1Þ
where lnQit is the logarithm of sales for UPC i at time t, RVit is the indicator of the
choice (1 = relative virtue, 0 = relative vice) for UPC i, lnPriceit is the logarithm of the
unit price paid for UPC i at time t, NBik is the indicator of national brand (1 = national
brand, 0 = store brand) for UPC i within each category k, STi is the type of stores visited
for each shopping occasion, SCi is the social class for each household, AGi indicates the
age of the primary shopper in each household,HSi indicates the size of each household,
and εit is the error term (i.i.d. N ~ 0, σ
2).
3 Because 1–4% alcohol by volume (ABV) is considered low alcohol content, we use any brand of beer
labeled BABV1.3 up to 3.3%^ and BABV 3.4 up to 4.1%^ to present the relative virtue choice in this product
category. As there is no specific Blow ABV^ label for beers, we conducted a post-test on 95 random UK
consumers, and the results show that 82% of the participants considered low ABV beer healthier than regular
beer. Furthermore, 70% of these participants reported that low ABV content was the key factor in identifying a
healthier/unhealthier beer.
4 The quantity and prices are standardized because items sold within the same category may differ in terms of
package size or be measured in inconsistent units. The quantity and price standardization details are available
on request.
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Thus, the price promotion effect is
PricePromoit ¼ β2 þ β3 if RVit ¼ 1β2 if RVit ¼ 0

When β3 > 0, the absolute value of the price coefficient of relative virtue is lower
than the absolute value of the price coefficient of relative vice. In contrast, when β3 < 0,
the absolute value of the price coefficient of relative virtue is higher than the absolute
value of the price coefficient of relative vice. Therefore, the significance level and sign
of β3 determine how the price promotion effects vary across relative virtue and vice.
The negative sign of β3 indicates that the price promotion effect is stronger for the
relative virtue choice than the relative vice choice and vice versa.
4 Empirical findings
4.1 Price promotion effects across healthy and unhealthy food
We estimate the effects of price on sales for the relative virtue and vice choices of four
product categories based on model 1. Thus, we estimate four sales equations with three
key variables of interest: β1 for lnPriceit, β2 for relative virtue, β3 for the interaction
term of lnPriceit and RVit, and the control variables. Table 3 shows the regression results
of the price effects and various statistics. All four equations are significant at the 0.01
Table 1 Cross-tabulation of relative virtue and relative vice choices
Baked beans Fresh fruit juices Crisps Beer Total
Relative virtue 33,461 46,359 7149 54,463 141,432
Relative vice 267,589 456,347 381,515 250,351 1,355,802
Total 301,050 502,706 388,664 304,814 1,497,234
Unhealthy Healthy Total
Relative virtue 61,612 79,820 141,432
Relative vice 631,866 723,936 1,355,802
Total 693,478 803,756 1,497,234
Store type
Convenience Everyday low price Hi-lo Total
Relative virtue 2884 23,600 114,948 141,432
Relative vice 34,463 155,861 1,166,478 1,356,802
Total 37,347 179,461 1,281,426 1,498,234
Social class
Low Medium High Total
Relative virtue 15,223 82,691 43,518 141,432
Relative vice 148,844 807,176 399,782 1,355,802
Total 164,067 889,867 443,300 1,497,234
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level, and the R2 values range from 0.1 to 0.7, indicating good model fit and high
predictive adequacy. The variance inflation factors indicate that there are no
multicollinearity problems in any of the equations.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the sample
Observation Baked beans Fresh fruit juices Crisps Beer
(301,050) (502,706) (388,664) (304,814)
Quantity
Mean 2.47 1.85 9.60 2.63
SD 1.80 1.44 8.83 2.78
Min 1 0.25 1 0.25
Max 48 36 288 42.24
Unit price
Mean 0.28 0.75 0.26 2.02
SD 0.18 0.43 0.33 0.79
Min 0.01 0.02 0 0.45
Max 2.82 7.4 3.42 5
Relative virtue
Mean 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.18
SD 0.31 0.29 0.13 0.38
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1
National brand
Mean 0.46 0.28 0.72 0.89
SD 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.32
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1
Social class
Observation 18,097
Mean 2.21
SD 0.6
Min 1
Max 3
Age
Mean 48.51
SD 15.72
Min 18
Max 89
Household size
Mean 2.70
SD 1.34
Min 1
Max 10
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As Table 3 shows, the estimated models suggest that, as expected, prices have a negative
and statistically significant effect on sales in all four categories, lnPriceit. The coefficients of
the interactive term, β3(RVit× lnPriceit), are negative and significant for both the healthy
products (Baked Beans : β3 = − 0.520 , p < 0.01 ; Fresh Fruit Juices : β3 = − 0.158 ,
p < 0.01) and positive and significant for both the unhealthy products (Crisps : β3 =
0.064 , p < 0.01 ;Beer :β3 = 0.905 , p < 0.01). The price elasticity of regular baked beans
is −0.346 (β2 = − 0.346, p < 0.01), and the price elasticity of low-sugar baked beans is the
sum of β2 and β3 , or −0.866 (β2 = − 0.346 , p < 0.01 ;β3 = − 0.520 , p < 0.01). The price
elasticity of regular fresh fruit juices is −0.358 (β2 = − 0.358, p < 0.01), and the price
elasticity of low-calorie fresh fruit juices is −0.516 (β2 = − 0.358 , p < 0.01 ; β3 = −
0.158 , p < 0.01). Thus, consumers are more sensitive to the price of low-sugar baked beans
than to regular baked beans and also more sensitive to the price of low-calorie fresh fruit
juices than to regular fresh fruit juices. The price elasticity of crisps is −1.041 (β2 = − 1.041,
p < 0.01), and the price elasticity of low-fat crisps is the sum of β2 and β3 , or −0.977 (β2 =
− 1.041 , p < 0.01 ; β3 = 0.064 , p < 0.01). The price elasticity of regular beer is
−1.961 (β2 = − 1.961, p < 0.01), and the price elasticity of low-alcohol beer is −1.056
(β2 = − 1.961 , p < 0.01 ; β3 = 0.905 , p< 0.01). Thus, consumers are more sensitive to the
price of regular crisps and regular beer than to the price of low-fat crisps and low-alcohol
beer. Therefore, H1 and H2 are supported.
4.2 Robustness check
To test the robustness of the results of our main model (model 1), we perform three
additional checks. First, we test whether the results differ across store types. We
estimate 12 sales equations for four product categories purchased in the hi-lo, everyday
low-price, and convenience stores, respectively. The 12 store-type equations are based
on model 1 without using STi as a control variable. Second, we test whether the results
differ across consumer groups. We estimate an additional 12 sales equations for four
product categories purchased by lower-, medium-, and higher-level social class groups,
respectively. Similar to the store-type equations, the 12 social class equations are based
on model 1 without using SCi as a control variable. Overall, we estimate 192 param-
eters for 24 equations for the first and second robustness checks. To simplify our
results, we present only three coefficients for each equation in Table 4: β1 for lnPriceit,
β2 for relative virtue, and β3 for the interaction term lnPriceit × relative virtue.
As Table 4 shows, the across-store-type results and the across-consumer-group results in
Table 4 are consistent with the overall results shown in Table 3. In summary, we find
consistent price promotion effect patterns on the relative virtue and vice choices of healthy
and unhealthy food across the different types of stores and different consumer groups.
Third, we test whether the results vary across model specifications with a set of
regressions for each product category.Model 2 includes three key predictors—relative virtue
(RVit), lnPrice (lnPriceit), and RVit× lnPriceit. Model 3 includes three key predictors and the
demographic characteristics (i.e., social class, age, and household size). Model 4 includes
three key predictors and the marketing factors (i.e., brand type and store type). The results of
models 2–4 are consistent with those of model 1. 5 Furthermore, price elasticities are
consistent across models, such that baked beans and fruit juices have relatively smaller price
5 Results are available on request.
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elasticities than crisps and beer. The former two are necessity products and less price elastic
than the latter two, which are indulgent products. In addition, the model specification of
model 1 outperforms specifications of models 2–4.
5 Discussion
This study extends existing literature in two important ways. First, it directly compares the
effects of price promotions on the relative virtue and vice choices of healthy food sales
Table 4 Parameter estimates across store types and social class
Dependent variable: Store types Social class
lnQuantity Everyday
Convenience Low Price Hi-lo store Lower Medium Higher
Baked beans Coef Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
β1relative virtue −0.773*** −0.653*** −0.700*** −0.874*** −0.683*** −0.632***
(−4.77) (−4.88) (−12.43) (−7.41) (−8.96) (−7.62)
β2 lnPrice −0.269*** −0.314*** −0.357*** −0.344*** −0.362*** −0.318***
(−4.01) (−24.83) (−38.56) (−13.16) (−36.43) (−22.39)
β3 relative virtue × lnPrice −0.504*** −0.413*** −0.522*** −0.619*** −0.518*** −0.458***
(−3.83) (−4.23) (−12.51) (−6.47) (−9.38) (−7.28)
Fresh fruit juices
β1relative virtue −0.0889** 0.0442 −0.122*** −0.139*** −0.127*** −0.0927***
(−3.18) (1.23) (−8.94) (−4.67) (−7.85) (−3.75)
β2 lnPrice −0.290*** −0.405*** −0.360*** −0.430*** −0.359*** −0.316***
(−7.29) (−18.72) (−44.58) (−20.76) (−36.66) (−21.51)
β3 relative virtue × lnPrice 0.106 −0.00753 −0.139*** −0.163** −0.187*** −0.134**
(−1.02) (−0.16) (−4.92) (−2.84) (−5.81) (−3.20)
Crisps
β1relative virtue −0.391* 0.129*** 0.105 0.120# 0.0506 0.0277
(−2.07) (3.47) (1.88) (1.75) (1.03) (0.4)
β2 lnPrice −1.070*** −1.078*** −1.036*** −0.990*** −1.044*** −1.062***
(−32.70) (−84.90) (−209.01) (−81.97) (−182.80) (−93.30)
β3 relative virtue × lnPrice −0.168 0.0522* 0.0844** 0.0715* 0.0695** 0.0269
(−1.10) (1.99) (3.12) (2.05) (2.80) (0.70)
Beer
β1relative virtue −1.511*** −1.847*** −1.981*** −2.056*** −1.962*** −1.911***
(−13.43) (−14.01) (−44.19) (−42.13) (−34.49) (−30.80)
β2 lnPrice −0.463*** −0.637*** −0.459*** −0.425* −0.437*** −0.571***
(−4.02) (−9.28) (−7.36) (−2.50) (−6.01) (−9.62)
β3 relative virtue × lnPrice 1.017*** 0.376** 0.790*** 0.688* 0.660*** 0.850***
(6.61) (5.74) (8.92) (2.55) (6.72) (11.46)
t statistics are in parentheses. Control variable coefficients are omitted but are available upon request
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; # p < 0.1
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(e.g., low-sugar vs regular baked beans) and relative virtue and vice choices of unhealthy
food sales (e.g., low-fat vs regular crisps). Second, it provides generalized finding of these
effects using scanner sales data combined with store type and social class information.
The hypotheses are based on the different levels of self-control consumers need when
purchasing healthy and unhealthy food (the degree of impulse buying) and goal congru-
ency theory. Data analysis empirically reveals a greater price promotion effect on relative
vice choices of unhealthy food (i.e., beer and crisps) than on relative virtue choices, but a
smaller price promotion effect on relative vice choices of healthy food (i.e., baked beans
and fresh fruit juices) than on relative virtue choices. Moreover, the effect pattern of price
promotions on the relative virtue and vice choices of healthy and unhealthy food is
constant across different types of stores and different groups of consumers.
In addition, the study shows that examining the price promotion effects of relative
virtue and vice choices without conceptualizing the price promotion effects across
healthy and unhealthy products separately is inappropriate, as the effects of price
promotions differ across these products. For healthy food, as predicted, demand for
relative vice choices is less price sensitive, resulting in a crossover of demand as prices
increase. In other words, demand for relative vice choices is increasingly constrained
when price constraints are relaxed during the price promotion period, even if these
choices are more palatable than their virtue counterparts. Moreover, healthy eating is
deliberative, and consumers are engaged in a highlighting dynamic of regulation when
they purchase healthy food; thus, they are more likely to buy more virtue choices of
healthy food on sale to adhere to their healthy-eating goals. This finding lends support
to our contention that consumers are more capable of adhering to a self-imposed
constraint on vices in healthy food consumption than in unhealthy food consumption.
In contrast, price promotions play a more vital role in boosting sales of relative vice
choices of unhealthy than healthy food. For unhealthy food, demand for relative vice
choices is more price sensitive, resulting in a sales boost through the price promotion.
This finding confirms the notion that consumers exhibit a greater impulse for unhealthy
than healthy food. Moreover, price promotion functions as a tempting mechanism to
justify relative vice over virtue choices of unhealthy food. Thus, stronger impulsiveness
in unhealthy food consumption and the temptation of price promotions explain why
consumers are more price sensitive to relative vice choices of unhealthy food than to
relative virtue choices of unhealthy food.
The effect pattern, which shows that the effects of price promotions on relative virtues
and vices are constant across different types of stores, indicates that the different pricing
strategies of stores are not factors that drive consumers to choose virtues over vices.
Consumers exhibit a similar choice pattern in choosing relative virtues and vices when
they shop across different stores. Furthermore, the price promotion effects of relative
virtues and vices are consistent within each social class of consumers. Thus, even if
consumers have different reasons for choosing virtues over vices and different price
sensitivities across social classes, the stronger effect of virtue in price promotions for
healthy food and the weaker effect of virtue in price promotions for unhealthy food do
not change across social classes. This implies that consumers’ degree of impulse buying
and the self-control problem are the dominant factors determining the effectiveness of
price promotions on relative virtues and vices across healthy and unhealthy food.
These results have important managerial implications, especially for retailers that
want to propel sales of both virtues and vices in healthy and unhealthy foods and
Mark Lett
manufacturers that want to negotiate profitable marketing plans with retailers. In
particular, the stronger effect of virtue in price promotions for healthy food and the
weaker effect of virtue in price promotions for unhealthy food indicate that marketing
managers should differentiate price promotions for different types of products.
Manufacturers of healthy food should give priority to price promotions for relative
virtue choices because these promotions are more profitable than those for relative vice
choices. For example, Heinz should negotiate with retailers to develop joint sales plans
that focus on price promotion activities for low-sugar rather than regular baked beans.
In contrast, manufacturers of unhealthy food should prioritize price promotions for
relative vice choices because such promotions are more profitable than those for
relative virtue choices. For example, Pringles should persuade retailers to conduct price
promotion plans more frequently on its regular rather than reduced fat crisps. Moreover,
retailers and manufacturers need to lower their expectations of the effects of price
promotions on relative virtue choices in unhealthy food and relative vice choices in
healthy food. For example, retailers should encourage Heineken to self-fund the price
promotion costs of its low-alcohol products. They should also suggest that Tropicana
decrease the price promotion frequency on its regular orange juice. Our findings show
the danger of adopting a homogeneous price promotion strategy for different types of
food and provide valuable information for retailers and manufacturers to make joint
price promotion decisions to attract consumer support and purchases.
The findings also provide useful information for public policy makers to effectively
decrease unhealthy vice purchases. That price promotion has a stronger effect on the
vice than virtue choices of unhealthy food indicates that price is a strong stimulus
triggering more vice-unhealthy food than virtue-unhealthy food. Limiting the frequency
of price promotions to vice-unhealthy food can effectively curb the temptation mech-
anism and thus drive consumers to purchase less vice-unhealthy food. Applying
surcharges to vice-unhealthy food is a straightforward way to highlight financial
disincentives and therefore significantly drive healthier consumption choices.
This study has some limitations that should be considered when interpreting its
results and contributions. The first limitation pertains to our measure of the effective-
ness of price promotions. Our arguments focus mainly on the own price promotion
effect of each type of product. Although empirical research has demonstrated the cross-
effects of price promotions (see Parreño-Selva et al. 2014), we cannot argue that our
study captures this effect, due to a lack of store-level transaction data to estimate cross-
effects. The second limitation involves the number of products examined in this study.
Although we examined four products, a lack of consumer-level transaction data
prevented us from including additional products.
Our findings also provide avenues for further research. We assess consumer pur-
chase behavior only from scanner data. A lab experiment could be conducted to test the
psychological process (e.g., impulsiveness, a highlighting dynamic of regulation)
behind buying behavior. A 2 (virtue/vice) × 2 (healthy/unhealthy) × 2 (promotion
yes, promotion no) design with attitudinal and process-dependent variables could
extend scanner data-based studies to delineate the psychological process. Such a study
could be distinguished strongly from investigations based solely on scanner data.
Moreover, that low-fat labeling increases food consumption for both normal-weight
and overweight people (Wansink and Chandon 2006) suggests that consumers’ actual
consumption of relative virtue/vice products is different from their purchases of such
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products (especially price-incentivized purchases). Thus, future studies could investi-
gate price promotion effects by accounting for the differences between purchases and
actual consumption of relative virtue/vice products. In addition, the price promotion
effects may vary between current and future choice behavior because buying virtues at
time t may lead to buying vices at time t + 1 (Hui, Bradlow, and Fader 2009).
Therefore, future studies could explore the degree to which price promotion effects
vary from time t to time t + 1 according to consumers’ previous choices between
relative virtues and vices.
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